



**FM 3-0**

# **Operations**

**JUNE 2001**

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**HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**



**UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF**

**Foreword**

On The Army's 226th birthday, we can reflect on a record of distinguished service to our Nation and honor those who have gone before us. Yet, we must also look forward to the challenges of the future as we transform ourselves with confidence in our ability to grow adaptive leaders who will sustain that record of service to our Nation. It is to that end that we publish FM 3-0, our capstone operations doctrine, which describes how Army forces, as part of the joint team, will be responsive and dominant across the full spectrum of operations.

The Army is a doctrine-based institution whose capabilities apply across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict. That spectrum describes an absolute requirement for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from military engagement to stability and support operations to major wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. Once forces are engaged anywhere on that spectrum, winning comes from the courage and competence of our soldiers, the excellence of their training, the confidence in their equipment, the soundness of their doctrine, and above all, the quality of their leadership.

Warfighting, and by extension less violent actions, depends on a few "rules of thumb." First, we win on the offense; we must be able to defend well, but you win on the offense. Next, we want to initiate combat on our terms -- at a time, in a place, and with a method of our own choosing -- not our adversary's, our choosing. Third, we want to gain the initiative and retain it -- never surrender it if possible. Fourth, we want to build momentum quickly. And finally, we want to win -- decisively. These rules of thumb require commanders to master transitions, to be adaptive. Transitions -- deployments, the interval between initial operation and sequels, consolidation on the objective, forward passage of lines -- sap operational momentum. Mastering transitions is key to maintaining momentum and winning decisively. This places a high premium on readiness -- well trained Soldiers; adaptive leaders who understand our doctrine; and versatile, agile, and lethal formations.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, discusses how to master those transitions, how to apply combat power, and how to think about operations. In short, it provides a professional intellectual framework for how we operate. FM 3-0 is the continuation of a work in progress. This edition has been shaped by our experiences and experiments since the first post-Cold War FM 100-5 published in 1993 and the duties we foresee for our Nation in this early part of the 21st century. Doctrine is an Army imperative. As such, we all need to read it, understand it, and apply its principles and concepts to our training, leader development, and warfighting execution. This ensures The Army will remain ready to fulfill its nonnegotiable contract with the American people -- to provide the landpower to fight and win the Nation's wars -- decisively.

Soldiers on point for the Nation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Eric K. Shinseki".

ERIC K. SHINSEKI  
General, United States Army

# Operations

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## **Preface**

Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and multinational operations. Army forces aggressively gain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success to control the nature, scope, and tempo of full spectrum operations in war and military operations other than war. Execution of this doctrine requires well-trained soldiers and units fueled with the warrior ethos, the best weapons and equipment available, and the solid leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers of character and competence.

### **PURPOSE**

FM 3-0 establishes the Army's keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations. The doctrine holds warfighting as the Army's primary focus and recognizes that the ability of Army forces to dominate land warfare also provides the ability to dominate any situation in military operations other than war. The foundation of FM 3-0 is built upon global strategic responsiveness for prompt, sustained Army force operations on land as a member of a joint or multinational force.

FM 3-0 is compatible with joint doctrine. It provides overarching doctrinal direction for the conduct of full spectrum operations detailed in other Army manuals. As the Army's principal tool for professional education in the art and the science of war, FM 3-0 presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted in actual military experience. FM 3-0 provides a foundation for the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

### **SCOPE**

FM 3-0 is divided into four parts. Part One (Chapters 1–3) discusses the Army's role in peace, conflict, and war. Part Two (Chapters 4–6) discusses the fundamentals of full spectrum operations, battle command, and the operations process. Part Three (Chapters 7–10) discusses the four types of Army operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and support. Part Four (Chapters 11 and 12) discusses information superiority and combat service support as enabling operations.

### **APPLICABILITY**

FM 3-0 provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for curricula within the Army Education System. Its audience is broad, from battalion through corps to other operational-level organizations. Officers and senior noncommissioned officers must read and understand FM 3-0.

### **ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION**

The proponent for this manual is Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, ATTN: ATZL-SWW, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1 Reynolds Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352.

Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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Cross-references use the new field manual numbering system. The bibliography lists field manuals by new number followed by old number.

The glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-0 that have joint or Army definitions. Terms for which FM 3-0 is the proponent manual (the authority) are indicated with an asterisk. The glossary does not contain these definitions, but lists the numbers of paragraphs where terms are defined. Definitions for which FM 3-0 is the proponent manual are printed in boldface in the text. Other definitions are not printed in boldface. Partial definitions of some terms for which FM 3-0 is not the proponent manual are provided in text boxes. See JP 1-02 for complete joint definitions and FM 1-02 for complete Army definitions.

The glossary contains referents of acronyms and definitions of terms not defined in JP 1-02 and FM 1-02. It does not list acronyms and abbreviations that are included for clarity only and appear one time, nor those that appear only in a figure and are listed in the legend for that figure. Some common abbreviations and acronyms—for example, the abbreviations for military ranks and publications—are not spelled out; refer to the glossary. Since *ARFOR* is a defined term as well as an acronym, it is not spelled out.

Some figures show engagement areas and objectives without names. These control measures are normally given names (see FM 1-02).

### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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## PART ONE

# The Environment of Operations

*The Army's deployment is the surest sign of America's commitment to accomplishing any mission that occurs on land.*

"The Army Vision," 1999

Part One discusses the Army's role in peace, conflict, and war. Warfighting is the Army's primary focus. The ability to dominate land warfare underscores the effectiveness and credibility of Army forces in full spectrum operations. Army forces are the centerpiece of unified action on land. They are strategically responsive, prepared to conduct prompt and sustained operations as part of joint, multinational, and inter-agency teams.

**Chapter 1** describes the Army's role in national defense, the six dimensions of the operational environment, and how Army forces prepare for and operate in that environment. It outlines the Army's mission essential tasks and describes doctrine for full spectrum operations. Finally, it discusses how leaders mold soldiers and units into confident, competent teams through tough, realistic training.

**Chapter 2** discusses unified action—the joint, multinational, and interagency aspects of full spectrum operations. It describes the contributions each armed service makes and how Army forces are employed within combatant commands.

**Chapter 3** addresses strategic responsiveness and force projection. It discusses the attributes of strategically responsive Army forces and the considerations that complement them. It describes the characteristics of force projection operations and the joint systems that support them. It outlines the different types of entry operations. It concludes with an overview of security during force projection and the use of intermediate staging bases.

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## Chapter 1

# The Army and the Role of Land Power

*[Y]ou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.*

T. R. Fehrenbach  
*This Kind of War*, 1963

1-1. Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and multinational operations. The Army organizes, trains, and equips its forces to fight and win the nation's wars and achieve directed national objectives. Fighting and winning the nation's wars is the foundation of Army service—the Army's non-negotiable contract with the American people and its enduring obligation to the nation.

## THE ROLE OF THE ARMY

1-2. Because Army forces fight and win the nation's wars, they also deter them. The object of deterrence is the will of state and nonstate political and military leaders. Deterrence establishes in the minds of potential adversaries that their actions will have unacceptable consequences. Today, potential adversaries rely on land-based military and paramilitary forces to retain power, coerce and control their populations, and extend influence beyond their borders. Army forces deter by threatening these means of power retention and population control with the ability to engage in decisive combat and seize and occupy adversary territory. Army forces also deter cross-border aggression through forward presence, forward deployment and prompt, flexible response. Army forces poised for action signal the unquestioned commitment of America to fight and win if deterrence fails.

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