

FM 3-07

STABILITY OPERATIONS

OCTOBER 2008

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

Foreword


Since the terrorist attacks on the American people seven years ago, we have been engaged in an epic struggle unlike any other in our history. This struggle, what may be the defining ideological conflict of the 21st century, is marked by the rising threat of a violent extremist movement that seeks to create anarchy and instability throughout the international system. Within this system, we also face emerging nations discontented with the status quo, flush with wealth and ambition, and seeking a new global balance of power. Yet the greatest threat to our national security comes not in the form of terrorism or ambitious powers, but from fragile states either unable or unwilling to provide for the most basic needs of their people.

As the Nation continues into this era of uncertainty and persistent conflict, the lines separating war and peace, enemy and friend, have blurred and no longer conform to the clear delineations we once knew. At the same time, emerging drivers of conflict and instability are combining with rapid cultural, social, and technological change to further complicate our understanding of the global security environment. Military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail in this environment. To confront the challenges before us, we must strengthen the capacity of the other elements of national power, leveraging the full potential of our interagency partners.

America's future abroad is unlikely to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq, where we grapple with the burden of nation-building under fire. Instead, we will work through and with the community of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states, and provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering. Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we strengthen our ability to generate "soft" power to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. At the heart of this effort is a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector.

The comprehensive approach ensures unity of effort among a very rich and diverse group of actors while fostering the development of new capabilities to shape the operational environment in ways that preclude the requirement for future military intervention. It postures the military to perform a role common throughout history—ensuring the safety and security of the local populace, assisting with reconstruction, and providing basic sustenance and public services. Equally important, it defines the role of military forces in support of the civilian agencies charged with leading these complex endeavors.

Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, represents a milestone in Army doctrine. It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history. It institutionalizes the hard-won lessons of the past while charting a path for tomorrow. This manual postures our military forces for the challenges of an uncertain future, an era of persistent conflict where the unflagging bravery of our Soldiers will continue to carry the banner of freedom, hope, and opportunity to the people of the world.



WILLIAM B. CALDWELL, IV
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commander
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

Stability Operations

Contents

	Page
PREFACE	iv
INTRODUCTION	vi
Chapter 1 THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT	1-1
The American Experience with Stability	1-1
The Strategic Approach	1-2
National Strategy	1-10
National and Defense Policies	1-13
Strategy for Stability Operations	1-16
Chapter 2 STABILITY IN FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS	2-1
Full Spectrum Operations	2-1
Department of State Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks	2-5
Primary Stability Tasks	2-9
Stability Operations Framework	2-12
Chapter 3 ESSENTIAL STABILITY TASKS	3-1
Identifying Essential Tasks	3-1
Primary Stability Tasks	3-2
The Role of Civil Affairs in Stability Operations	3-21
Mission-Essential Tasks in Stability Operations	3-22
Chapter 4 PLANNING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS	4-1
Planning Fundamentals	4-1
Planning Foundations	4-4
Designing Stability Operations	4-6
Chapter 5 TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY	5-1
Authority and Command Responsibility	5-1
Organizing for Transitional Military Authority	5-3
Guidelines for Transitional Military Authority	5-5
Courts and Claims	5-9

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

***This publication supersedes FM 3-07, 20 February 2003.**

Contents

Chapter 6	SECURITY SECTOR REFORM	6-1
	Background	6-1
	Integrated Security Sector Reform	6-2
	Security Sector Reform Planning	6-5
	Comprehensive Security Sector Reform	6-10
	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	6-19
Appendix A	INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS	A-1
Appendix B	INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM	B-1
Appendix C	USAID PRINCIPLES FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT	C-1
Appendix D	INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW	D-1
Appendix E	HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PRINCIPLES	E-1
Appendix F	PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS	F-1
Appendix G	SUMMARY OF CHANGES	G-1
	SOURCE NOTES	Source Notes-1
	GLOSSARY	Glossary-1
	REFERENCES	References-1
	INDEX	Index-1

Figures

Figure 1-1. Comprehensive approach to stability operations	1-5
Figure 1-2. The fragile states framework	1-10
Figure 1-3. Strategy and policy references for stability operations	1-11
Figure 2-1. Full spectrum operations	2-1
Figure 2-2. An integrated approach to stability operations	2-5
Figure 2-3. The fragile states spectrum	2-12
Figure 2-4. The stability operations framework.....	2-13
Figure 3-1. Relating information engagement to the primary stability tasks.....	3-20
Figure 4-1. Example of stability lines of effort.....	4-10
Figure 4-2. Using SWEAT-MSO	4-11
Figure 6-1. Elements of the security sector	6-3
Figure A-1. Country team members	A-2
Figure A-2. Notional civil-military operations center (battalion and above)	A-13
Figure A-3. Coordination within the CMOC	A-14
Figure D-1. Conflict diagnosis.....	D-4
Figure D-2. Dynamics of instability	D-8
Figure D-3. Analyzing causes of instability	D-11
Figure F-1. Example of provincial reconstruction team organization	F-3

Tables

Table A-1. Members of NATO	A-9
Table A-2. Example of coordination centers	A-12
Table D-1. Tactical stability matrix	D-12
Table E-1. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Nongovernmental Organization Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief	E-5
Table G-1. New Army terms	G-3

Preface

Field Manual (FM) 3-07 is the Army's keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. FM 3-07 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. It also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Training System curricula.

The six chapters that make up this edition of *Stability Operations* constitute the Army's approach to the conduct of full spectrum operations in any environment across the spectrum of conflict. This doctrine focuses on achieving unity of effort through a comprehensive approach to stability operations, but remains consistent with, and supports the execution of, a broader "whole of government" approach as defined by the United States Government (USG). The core of this doctrine includes the following:

- Chapter 1 describes the strategic context that frames the Army's comprehensive approach to stability operations. It includes discussion of the strategic environment, USG strategy and policy, and interagency efforts to define an integrated approach to stability operations that leverages the collective efforts of a wide array of actors toward a commonly understood and recognized end state.
- Chapter 2 links full spectrum operations to broader efforts aiming to achieve stability, emphasizing the simultaneous nature of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. It describes the phasing paradigm that defines stability operations activities conducted before, during, and after combat operations. Finally, the chapter links the primary stability tasks with broader interagency stability sectors to provide the foundation for civil-military integration at the tactical level.
- Chapter 3 addresses the essential stability tasks that comprise military stability operations. It provides a detailed discussion of each of the five primary stability tasks, and describes the subordinate tasks that constitute the range of activities in stability operations. It includes doctrine that describes the role of civil affairs forces in stability operations as the commander's conduit for civil-military integration. Finally, it describes development of mission-essential and directed task list development to support stability operations.
- Chapter 4 discusses the fundamental principles of the detailed component of planning, focused on the stability element of full spectrum operations. It builds on the precepts established in FMs 3-0 and 5-0, providing a systemic approach to planning and assessing stability operations.
- Chapter 5 addresses transitional military authority and provides doctrine concerning command responsibility, establishment, and organization of military government to support stability operations. It includes principles for establishing judicial structures to enable transitional military authority.
- Chapter 6 provides the doctrinal foundation for security sector reform, and introduces security force assistance as the capacity-building activity that encompasses organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising host-nation security forces. It also sets disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as a fundamental element of security sector reform.

Seven appendixes complement the body of the manual.

Army doctrine is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-07 links stability operations doctrine to joint operations doctrine as expressed in joint doctrinal publications, specifically, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 and JP 5-0. FM 3-07 expands on the fundamental principles of operations expressed in FM 3-0 and links those principles to a comprehensive approach to stability operations within the framework of full spectrum operations. FM 3-07 also uses text and concepts developed in conjunction with North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners.

The principal audience for FM 3-07 is the middle and senior leadership of the Army, officers in the rank of major and above, who command Army forces or serve on the staffs that support those commanders. It is just as applicable to the civilian leadership of the Army. This manual is also intended to serve as a resource for the other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, agencies of other governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities who seek to develop a better understanding of the role of the military in broader reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

FM 3-07 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. *Text references*: Definitions for which FM 3-07 is the proponent publication are in boldfaced text. *Glossary references*: Terms for which FM 3-07 is the proponent (authority) publication include an asterisk in the glossary entry. These terms and their definitions will be included in the next revision of FM 1-02. For other definitions within the text, the term is italicized and the reference number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

The term “adversaries” includes both enemies and adversaries when used in the context of joint definitions.

FM 3-07 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

This manual contains copyrighted material.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) by mail to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD (FM 3-07), 201 Reynolds Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to leav-cadd-web-cadd@conus.army.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. When published, other sources of quotations will be listed in the source notes.

Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider's View of Iraq's Reconstruction, by James Stephenson. Reproduced with permission of Potomac Books, Incorporated. Copyright © 2007.

“The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” by Andrew S. Natsios. Reproduced with permission of *Parameters*. Copyright © 2005.

State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, by Francis Fukuyama. Reproduced with permission of Cornell University Press. Copyright © 2004.

Introduction

Today, the Nation remains engaged in an era of persistent conflict against enemies intent on limiting American access and influence throughout the world. This is a fundamental clash of ideologies and cultures, waged across societal abysses separating rich ethnic and religious traditions and profound differences in perspective. The Nation is embarking on a journey into an uncertain future where these precipitous divides threaten to expand as a result of increased global competition for natural resources, teeming urban populations with rising popular expectations, unrestrained technological diffusion, and a global economy struggling to meet the mounting demands from emerging markets and third world countries.

The character of this conflict is unlike any other in recent American history, where military forces operating among the people of world will decide the major battles and engagements. The greatest threats to our national security will not come from emerging ambitious states but from nations unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their people. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms from the wars of our past. However, time may be the ultimate arbiter of success: time to bring safety and security to an embattled populace; time to provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian needs of the people; time to restore basic public order and a semblance of normalcy to life; and time to rebuild the institutions of government and market economy that provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability. This is the essence of stability operations.

Joint doctrine provides a definition for stability operations that captures the role of military forces to support broader governmental efforts:

[Stability operations encompass] various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0).

This manual proceeds from that definition to establish the broad context in which military forces assume that role before, during, and after combat operations, across the spectrum of conflict. In doing so, the manual focuses the efforts of military forces appropriately in support of the other instruments of national and international power; thus, the manual defines a comprehensive approach to stability operations in a complex and uncertain future. For Army forces, those efforts are fundamental to full spectrum operations.

The essential nature of stability operations in this era of persistent conflict became increasingly clear following combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recognizing this shift in focus, the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented DODD 3000.05 in November 2005. The directive emphasized that stability operations were no longer secondary to combat operations, stating:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

The directive further stressed that stability operations were likely more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations. Thus, the directive elevated stability operations to a status equal to that of the offense and defense. That fundamental change in emphasis sets the foundation for this doctrine.

This manual addresses military stability operations in the broader context of United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts. It describes the role of military forces in supporting those broader efforts by leveraging the coercive and constructive capabilities of the force to establish a safe and secure

environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and help transition responsibility to a legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law. This transition is fundamental to the shift in focus toward long-term developmental activities where military forces support broader efforts in pursuit of national and international objectives. Success in these endeavors typically requires a long-term commitment by external actors and is ultimately determined by the support and participation of the host-nation population.

However, this manual also provides doctrine on how those capabilities are leveraged to support a partner nation as part of peacetime military engagement. Those activities, executed in a relatively benign security environment as an element of a combatant commander's theater security cooperation plans, share many of the same broad goals as stability operations conducted after a conflict or disaster. Such activities aim to build partner capacity, strengthen legitimate governance, maintain rule of law, foster economic growth, and help to forge a strong sense of national unity. Ideally, these are addressed before, rather than after, conflict. Conducted within the context of peacetime military engagement, they are essential to sustaining the long-term viability of host nations and provide the foundation for multinational cooperation that helps to maintain the global balance of power.

Through a comprehensive approach to stability operations, military forces establish conditions that enable the efforts of the other instruments of national and international power. By providing the requisite security and control to stabilize an operational area, those efforts build a foundation for transitioning to civilian control, and eventually to the host nation. Stability operations are usually conducted to support a host-nation government or a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate, functioning host-nation government exists. Generally, military forces establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until a civil authority or the host nation is capable of providing these services for the local populace. They perform specific functions as part of a broader response effort, supporting the complementary activities of other agencies, organizations, and the private sector. When the host nation or other agency cannot fulfill their role, military forces may be called upon to significantly increase its role, including providing the basic civil functions of government.

By nature, stability operations are typically lengthy endeavors. All tasks must be performed with a focus toward maintaining the delicate balance between long-term success and short-term gains. Ultimately, stability operations do not necessarily aim to reduce the military presence quickly but to achieve broader national policy goals that extend beyond the objectives of military operations. The more effective those military efforts are at setting conditions that facilitate the efforts of the other instruments of national power, the more likely it is that the long-term commitment of substantial military forces will not be required.

To that end, military forces have to operate with the other instruments of national power to forge unity of effort through a whole of government approach. This approach accounts for a wider range of considerations beyond those of the military instrument, ensuring that planning accounts for broader national policy goals and interests. For the commander and staff, this may mean planning and executing operations within an environment of political ambiguity. As a result, the potentially slow development process of government reconstruction and stabilization policy may frustrate flexible military plans that adapt to the lethal dynamics of combat operations. Thus, integrating the planning efforts of all the agencies and organizations involved in a stability operation is essential to long-term peace and stability.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 1

The Strategic Context

It is needless to say that Charles Gordon held a totally different view of the soldier's proper sphere of action, and with him the building part of the soldier's profession was far more important than the breaking part.... The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.

Colonel Sir William F. Butler
Charles George Gordon

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH STABILITY

1-1. During the relatively short history of the United States, military forces have fought only eleven wars considered conventional. From the American Revolution through Operation Iraqi Freedom, these wars represented significant or perceived threats to national security interests, where the political risk to the nation was always gravest. These were the wars for which the military traditionally prepared; these were the wars that endangered America's very way of life. Of the hundreds of other military operations conducted in those intervening years, most are now considered stability operations, where the majority of effort consisted of stability tasks. Contrary to popular belief, the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat.

1-2. America's experience with stability operations began with the *Royal Proclamation of 1763*. King George III of Great Britain issued it after the British acquired French territory in North America following the French and Indian War. Intended to stabilize relations with Native Americans, the proclamation established British foreign policy to regulate trade, settlement, and land purchases on the British Empire's vast western frontier. The proclamation also limited expansion of the thirteen colonies, essentially outlawing them from purchasing or settling territory west of the Appalachian Mountains. With the Proclamation, King George III authorized the British military to execute colonial policy in the Americas, including the ability to detain and arrest those who violated the proclamation.

1-3. Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 3 September 1783, Congress appointed military commissioners to negotiate peace treaties and land purchases with native tribes. However, Congress had no means of enforcing the policy. In 1786, it passed *The Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs* and placed the program under Secretary of War Henry Knox. Secretary Knox directed the commanders of the frontier posts to support the Indian superintendents in settling disputes, regulating trade, adjusting land claims, and enforcing the law. Later, President George Washington tasked Secretary Knox with developing and implementing a military plan to prevent hostilities against settlers on former Indian lands. This experience continued in the trans-Mississippi West for the rest of the nineteenth century, where military forces enforced treaty agreements while protecting settlers moving into the western United States.

1-4. During the occupation of central Mexico from 1846 to 1848, General Winfield Scott quickly achieved the support of the local populace through programs focused on their immediate needs. His forces protected the goods and trade routes of local merchants, allowing markets to reopen quickly in the aftermath of operations. He instituted local programs to remove accumulated garbage and the obvious signs of war. Finally, he established civilian jobs programs that infused much needed cash into the local economies.

1-5. During Reconstruction following the Civil War, military forces maintained order and provided security. These forces also initiated comprehensive measures to establish new state governments, hold

elections, ensure the well-being of freed slaves, and provide for economic and social development. Military forces assumed three roles during Reconstruction in the South:

- As an occupation force following the war, supporting a Presidential-appointed civilian government.
- As a military government under the Reconstruction Acts of 1867.
- As a supporting force to elected state governments until 1877.

1-6. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States conducted a number of small-scale military operations around the world. It imposed a military government in Cuba, initiating free elections; reform of the security sector; and health, sanitation, and public works programs. A similar effort in the Philippines, however, resulted in a nationalist uprising that evolved into an insurgency lasting more than a decade. When President Woodrow Wilson ordered American forces into the Mexican coastal city of Veracruz in 1914, Soldiers soon found themselves performing the same humanitarian, governmental, economic, and security tasks performed in Cuba and the Philippines 15 years earlier. In 1915, the Marine Corps began a series of Caribbean interventions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. However, they faced constant armed, irregular opposition from the local populace and had little success establishing effective constitutional governments using the lessons of the past.

1-7. The occupations of Germany and Japan following World War II serve as models for modern post-conflict stability operations as the Army reorganized and retrained its forces for a peacetime role focused on the reconstruction and development of war-torn nations. The postwar occupation of Japan provides similar lessons. The initial 60 days of occupation focused on disarmament and demobilization, essential to the demilitarization of the Japanese military complex and the democratization of Japanese society. In 1958, following the overthrow and murder of the pro-American Iraqi royal government, President Dwight Eisenhower ordered military forces to conduct a show of force to help quell civil unrest in Lebanon, providing much-needed stability to the Beirut government.

1-8. Vietnam earned America invaluable experience with the complexity of conducting operations *among the people*. Military forces contended with an established insurgency while working alongside the other instruments of national power to bring peace and stability to South Vietnam. Through the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (known as CORDS), the efforts of the Departments of State and Defense were integrated under a “single manager concept” that effectively achieved the civil-military unity of effort vital to success. While the overall war effort was ultimately unsuccessful, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support provided valuable lessons that helped shape contemporary approaches to stability operations.

1-9. Following the end of the Cold War, the Army began reducing force structure while preparing to reap the benefits of a new era of peace. The benefits of this “peace dividend” were never realized. The strategic environment evolved from one characterized by the bipolar nature of the relationship between the world’s dominant powers to one of shared responsibility across the international community. In the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Army led or participated in more than 15 stability operations, intervening in places such as Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, and the Balkans. Many of these efforts continued into the new century, and incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq revealed a disturbing trend throughout the world: the collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty. The global implications of such destabilizing forces proved staggering.

THE STRATEGIC APPROACH

1-10. In the complex, dynamic strategic environment of the 21st century, significant challenges to sustainable peace and security persist across the spectrum of conflict. In this world of sovereign states, unequal in development and resources, tension and conflict are ubiquitous. Sources of instability that push parties toward open conflict, known as drivers of conflict, include religious fanaticism, global competition for resources, climate change, residual territorial claims, ideology, ethnic tension, elitism, greed, and the desire for power. The drivers of conflict emerge as numerous symptoms of crises worldwide. In this era of persistent conflict, rapidly evolving terrorist structures, transnational crime, and ethnic violence continue to