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TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

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Preface

This field manual provides tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning, mission management, and reporting. It provides TTP for the development of intelligence to support counterreconnaissance (CR) operations. It describes employment considerations for R&S assets; and defines the roles of the collection manager and maneuver brigade and battalion S2's in planning R&S operations. It describes their roles in identifying intelligence requirements to support CR operations.

This manual addresses TTP for planning and conducting R&S and developing intelligence to support CR operations at maneuver brigade and below. It can also apply to armored cavalry regiment (ACR) and separate brigades.

This manual is intended for maneuver commanders and their staffs (especially S2s); intelligence staffs and collection managers; and other personnel involved in planning and conducting R&S and developing intelligence to support CR operations. It is intended for use by both active and Reserve Components (RC) and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools.

The doctrine in this publication conforms with and supports the principles contained in FM 34-1.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, AZ. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TDL-D, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, military leaders have recognized the importance of R&S. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy is essential to win the battle. Our own military history contains many examples where our knowledge of the enemy, or lack of knowledge, directly led to victory or defeat.

The role of R&S has not changed on the modern battlefield; if anything, it has become even more important. Battles at the combat training centers prove that a good R&S effort is critical to successful attacks. On the other hand, a poor R&S effort almost guarantees defeat for the commander. Figure 1-1 shows attack outcome according to reconnaissance status (Blue Force [BLUFOR]). This chart was developed by the Rand Corporation in its October 1987 study, "Applying the National Training Center Experience: Tactical Reconnaissance."

The message is clear: Success on the battlefield begins with R&S and R&S begins with the intelligence officer. As the S2, you play a big role in the success or failure of your unit. But if being able to find the enemy is critical to the attack, what role does the S2 play in the defense?

Figure 1-2 shows the attack outcome according to reconnaissance status (Opposing Force [OPFOR]). This is another chart from the same Rand study. It clearly shows: If you blind the enemy, they will most likely fail in the attack. Therefore, a successful defense depends on finding, targeting, destroying, or suppressing enemy reconnaissance assets before they can report your unit's defensive positions.

RECONNAISSANCE	STATUS	BATTLE OUTCOME		
		SUCCESS	FAILURE	STANDOFF
Good	13	9	1	3
Poor	50	4	38	8

Figure 1-1. Attack outcome according to reconnaissance status (BLUFOR).

RECONNAISSANCE	STATUS	BATTLE OUTCOME		
		SUCCESS	FAILURE	STANDOFF
Good	28	26	1	1
Poor	5	0	5	0

Figure 1-2. Attack outcome according to reconnaissance status (OPFOR).