

ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS (EAC)  
INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE (IEW) OPERATIONS

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## Preface

In the mid-seventies, two events created a void in echelons above corps (EAC) intelligence doctrine and force structure: the transition of Army doctrine from field Army to EAC and the implementation of decisions resulting from the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study. In 1982, the Army Chief of Staff approved the changes resulting from this document for planning purposes. During this time, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) completed the EAC Intelligence, Security, and Electronic Warfare Architecture Study. This was the base document for EAC intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) force development. FM 100-16, published in April 1985, incorporated key IEW doctrinal principles.

This manual applies those principles to the Military Intelligence (MI) brigades (EAC) that support IEW in different theaters. The brigades are the critical parts of the IEW structure established at EAC. The IEW functions of the MI brigades (EAC) forge the links with the EAC staff, the echelons above corps intelligence center (EACIC), echelons corps and below (ECB), other MI brigade elements, other services, and national level intelligence agencies.

This manual provides the doctrine for EAC IEW operations, including organizations, missions, functions, and capabilities of MI organizations at EAC. This

manual further supports Army doctrine described in FM 100-5 and FM 100-20.

This manual is not designed nor intended to be a descriptive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) manual. The uniqueness of the EAC theaters in which the IEW units are located prohibits such a task. The geographical and operational focus of the theaters, along with command and National Command Authorities (NCA) guidance, orients the specific IEW support missions; for example, functional and regional tailoring to best achieve the assigned mission.

Chapter 1 describes how the general political and military environment of theaters of operation are formed. It also describes how the IEW structure forms to the operational level focus of the theaters and supports the Army's AirLand Battle Doctrine and IEW doctrinal principles and tasks. All intelligence disciplines have been included in the functional description.

The remainder of the manual discusses the organization of the MI brigades (EAC) under the new "L" series tables of organization and equipment (TOEs). These TOEs provide the framework for describing the missions and functions of the brigade and its subordinate units. These TOEs may be augmented with tables of distribution and allowances (TDAs) force structures. However, such TDA organizations

are theater dependent and are not included in this manual.

This manual is for commanders, staff, and key personnel of all EAC organizations--combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS). It describes the organization and functions of theater level IEW units and how they support the formulation of operational level intelligence. It thus lends support to the operational planning by all Army units within their functional missions. It should also be used by members of United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) service schools and other military organizations.

The proponent of this publication is HQ, USAICS. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS), ATTN: ATSI-TD-DP, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000.

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Unless this publication states otherwise masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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## CHAPTER 1

### FORMULATION OF ARMY THEATER INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT

The focus of this manual is on the MI brigades (EAC). These brigades are found in, or are focused upon, operational theaters worldwide where US forces may be employed to support or protect US national security interests and/or those of our Allies. In order to recognize the important role MI brigades (EAC) play in these theaters, one must first understand other factors which influence and shape military policy within the theaters.

AirLand Battle Doctrine requires that the IEW system provide timely and accurate multidiscipline intelligence, electronic warfare (EW), and counterintelligence (CI) to all echelons. To ensure victory on the battlefield, the campaign plan in a theater of operations calls for the achievement of the theater's strategic goals. The success of the IEW mission to support attaining these goals depends on detailed planning and execution of all phases of IEW operations.

#### THEATER OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

National strategy is the plan or expression of the coordinated use of national power which includes political, economic, psychological, and military power during peace, crisis, or war to secure national objectives. It is based on both national

capabilities and threats to the nation and on a thorough assessment of potential enemies.

Military power in support of national strategy is based on deterring and, if this fails, successfully executing assigned missions. Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) execute the use of military power in support of US national strategy. Their strategic guidance is expressed in terms of--

- o Aims (to deter or, if necessary, to fight and win).
- o Resources (the forces and sustainment allocated to a region).
- o Limiting factors (what they must do and cannot do in applying those forces).

Military strategy is the combination of military objectives (ends), military concepts (ways), and military force (means) to achieve national security policy objectives. Effective military strategy includes all aspects of preparing military power for its most effective application on a global or regional scale to achieve or secure national objectives. The CINC's mission, then, is to translate the strategic guidance received into operational terms so that he and subordinate commanders can apply military power