

**INFANTRY DIVISION OPERATIONS**  
**Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures**

***PREFACE***

Field manual (FM) 71-100-2 is a “how to” guide for the employment of US light, airborne, and air assault infantry divisions in combat. It describes tactics and techniques for the conduct of combat operations and the integration and coordination of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) functions. It supports the doctrinal concepts and principles of FM 71-100. The tactics and techniques in this manual are illustrative in nature and a guide only. Readers should not assume these methods are the only way of conducting operations. FM 71-100-2 must be used in conjunction with FM 101-5.

This manual has been written for the division commander and his staff, major subordinate units of the division and corps, and students at service and staff colleges. Other service and allied commanders and staffs may also find FM 71-100-2 useful in understanding how the infantry division plans and executes operations. FM 71-100-2 is compatible with current joint and combined doctrine. The authors assume the user has read FMs 100-5, 100-2-1, 100-15, 71-100, 101-5, and 101-5-1.

Unless otherwise stated, masculine pronouns apply to both men and women.

The term armored units refers to both armored and mechanized forces.

The proponent for this publication is the Combined Arms Command, TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Command, ATTN: ATZL-SWW-D, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900.

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## ***INTRODUCTION***

Since the publication of the 1986 version of FM 100-5, the world and our Army have undergone significant changes. Our country has been involved in three key victories—Panama, the Gulf War, and the Cold War. Concurrently, the Army has undergone a force structure change, reducing the size of the Army and the number of forward deployed units geared to counter a Warsaw Pact invasion. These external and internal changes have caused us to modify how we as an Army think and conduct warfare. The 1993 version of FM 100-5 reflects these changes.

Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative, but not directive; descriptive, not prescriptive. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from the Army's collective experience with warfare. However, doctrine cannot replace clear thinking or alter a commander's obligation to determine the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision.

The five Army operations tenets are the basis for the development of all current US Army doctrine, tactics, and techniques. Success on the battlefield will depend on our ability to fight according to these tenets: initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility.

*Initiative* sets or changes the terms of battle by action. It is the effort to force the enemy to conform to our operational tempo and purpose while retaining our freedom of action. This will require commanders to understand the intent of their commanders two levels above—centralized planning but decentralized execution.

*Agility* is the ability to act faster than the enemy—a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. Quickness permits the rapid concentration of combat power against the enemy's vulnerabilities. It requires the commander to constantly read the battlefield, anticipate, make quick decisions, and act without hesitation. This may require committing forces quickly without complete information when situations are time-sensitive. Agility is both mental and physical flexibility—seeing and reacting rapidly to changing situations.

*Depth* is the extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose. The commander uses these factors in thinking in depth to forecast, anticipate likely events, and expand his freedom of action. He then applies them to arrange all available resources to attack the enemy simultaneously and sequentially throughout the depth of the battlefield.

*Synchronization* is the focus of resources and activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point. Although the activities such as intelligence, logistics, and fires and maneuver may occur at different times and places, they are synchronized when their combined consequences are felt at the decisive time and place. The product of effect synchronization is the maximum use of every resource where it will make the greatest contribution to success.

*Versatility* is the ability to shift focus, to tailor forces, and to move from one mission to another rapidly and efficiently. It implies a capacity to be multifunctional, to operate across regions throughout the full range of military operations, and to perform at the tactical, operational, and strategic level.

Again, doctrine presents principles that guide the employment of forces. Tactics, techniques, and procedures found in FM 71-100-2 support US Army doctrine. As professional soldiers, we must take these principles and apply them to our given missions and operations.

## CHAPTER 1

### LIGHT, AIR ASSAULT, AND AIRBORNE INFANTRY DIVISIONS

*The mission of light, air assault, and airborne infantry divisions is to close with and destroy the enemy as well as to control land areas, including population and resources. These divisions make optimum use of offensive, decentralized, irregular-type operations by highly trained small units. Infantry divisions are austere and capable of conducting independent operations for only 48 hours. They are experts in urban warfare, jungle warfare, and infiltration operations and can kill enemy armored vehicles on any battlefield.*

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#### LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION

The organization of the light infantry division (Figure 1-1) provides it the flexibility to accomplish global missions on different types of terrain and against a variety of enemy forces. It differs from other infantry divisions in both design and concept of employment.

The light infantry division is the most rapidly and strategically deployable of the various types of US divisions. It is organized to fight as part of a larger force or a joint task force in conventional conflicts, or independently in operations other than war. The ability of its command and control structure to readily accept augmentation forces permits task organizing for almost any situation, in almost any environment. The factors of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available) largely determine the augmentations required for the division. (Common augmentation includes helicopters, artillery, military police, truck units, engineers, psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil affairs.

Although employed as an entity, the division disperses widely throughout a large area and conducts synchronized, but decentralized, operations, primarily at night or during periods of limited visibility. It achieves mass through the combined effects of synchronized, small-unit operations and fires rather than through the physical concentration of forces on the battlefield. Massing of light division forces occurs only when the risk is low and the payoff is high.

At the tactical level, the best use of the light force is as a division under corps control. The corps commander must ensure that the mission assigned to the light force capitalizes on its capabilities. The division conducts operations exploiting the advantages of restricted terrain and limited visibility.

#### AIR ASSAULT DIVISION

The air assault division (Figure 1-2) combines strategic mobility with an extremely high degree of tactical mobility within its area of operations (AO). The air assault division conducts combat operations with infantry, aviation, and the necessary CS and CSS to strike overextended distances and terrain obstacles to attack the enemy—deep, fast, and often.

Airmobile divisions provided the US Army the operational foundation for air assault division operations. However, the air assault division conducts more than airmobile operations. It is important to recognize the distinction between airmobility and air assault. Airmobility is the use of Army aircraft whenever and however they improve our ability to fight. Essentially, movement of troops and equipment from one secure area to another is conducted with the helicopters which depart the AO after insertion. Conversely, air assault operations involve combat, CS, and CSS elements (aircraft and troops) deliberately task-organized for tactical operations. Aviation assets are completely integrated with ground forces. Additionally, air assault operations generally involve insertions and extractions under hostile conditions, as opposed to mere air movement of troops to and from secure locations about the battlefield.

Once deployed on the ground, air assault infantry battalions normally fight like those of the infantry division; however, normal task organization of organic aviation increases firepower and permits rapid aerial redeployment. The essence of modern-day air assault tactics is rapid tempo of operations over extended ranges by air assault task forces. Execution of successive air assault operations enables the division commander to seize and maintain the initiative.




Figure 1-1. Light infantry division




Figure 1-2. Air assault division