

DIVISION OPERATIONS

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PREFACE

On 14 June 1993, the Army issued its new keystone doctrine in Field Manual (FM) 100-5. It clearly and concisely expresses how the Army intends to conduct war and operations other than war (OOTW) now and into the twenty-first century. This manual builds on the doctrinal principles described in FM 100-5 as well as those described in FM 100-15. It applies these doctrinal principles and new concepts to the full dimension of Army division operations. Additionally, this manual is consistent with joint doctrine. Joint doctrine is Army doctrine. This is the capstone manual for Army division operations.

This manual will assist division commanders, their staffs, and subordinate commanders in planning and conducting division operations. It will guide many organizations regarding the capabilities, limitations, and employment of US Army divisions. It also will guide the development of subordinate unit doctrine.

FM 71-100 sets forth doctrinal principles that apply to all types of Army divisions. It does not address specific tactics, techniques, or procedures (TTP) except when necessary to clarify or emphasize principles. TTP are presented in supporting manuals such as FM 71-100-1, FM 71-100-2, and FM 71-100-3. Users, however, should have a fundamental understanding of doctrine expressed in JP 3.0, JP 5-00.2, FM 100-5, FM 101-5, FM 101-5-1, and FM 100-15.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. The proponent of this publication is Headquarters, TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-SWW-D, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900.

INTRODUCTION

The world geopolitical environment will continue to impact directly on United States (US) military strategy. In support of US military strategy, the Army projects force to deter aggression worldwide. Should deterrence fail, Army forces are prepared to defeat the enemy across the full range of military operations. In the future, force-projection operations will be the norm as forward-deployed divisions return to the continental United States.

The Army classifies its activities as war and operations other than war (those activities that occur during peace and conflict). US Army operations are varied, ranging from aid and assistance to a foreign government to full combat operations against a well-armed hostile force. Conflict challenges can range from an emergent superpower or a hostile regional power to a less sophisticated, but no less determined, insurgent force.

US Army divisions respond to these challenges by deploying versatile combined arms forces. Although divisions task-organize combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) forces to accomplish assigned missions in both war and operations other than war, they focus on force projection and combat operations. Division training requirements are based on assigned operation plans (OPLANs) and directives. Missions and tasks not associated with OPLANs and authorized directives can be accomplished as functions of versatility—commanders rapidly shifting their focus, and their units quickly adapting to new missions and tasks. Versatile soldiers, leaders, and units make up our Army divisions.

Synchronization of division assets is vital to all division operations. Divisions employ armored or mechanized forces, light forces, or a combination of both with appropriate support units. Armored and mechanized divisions are characterized by highly mobile and protected weapon systems from which our soldiers fight. Light forces (airborne, air assault, and light divisions) are characterized by lighter, predominantly hand-held small arms, and light crew-served weapon systems. Personnel in these units primarily use dismounted movement techniques to close with and destroy the enemy.

Divisions contribute to the joint battle. They normally operate as part of a corps (with joint support), a joint task force (JTF), or a multinational force. Divisions usually engage in tactical-level warfare; that is, they fight battles and engagements within the context of operational-level campaign plans. Division-level tactics involve the movement and positioning of maneuver forces on the battlefield in relation to the enemy, massing of combat power, and providing of logistic support for division forces prior to, during, and following engagements. Commanders within divisions are principally concerned with accomplishing their near-term objectives.

US Army division operations are based on the Army tenets of initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility. Initiative sets or changes the terms of battle by action. It is the effort to force the enemy to conform to our operational tempo and purpose, while retaining our freedom of action. This requires commanders to understand the intent of their commanders two levels above—centralized planning, but decentralized execution.

Agility is the ability to act faster than the enemy—a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. Agility permits the rapid concentration of combat power against the enemy's vulnerabilities. It requires the commander to constantly read the battlefield, anticipate, make quick decisions, and act without hesitation. This may require committing forces quickly without complete information when situations are time-sensitive. Agility requires both mental and physical flexibility—seeing and reacting rapidly to changing situations.

Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose. Commanders use these factors in thinking in depth to forecast, anticipate likely events, and expand their freedom

of action. They then apply them to arrange all available resources to set the conditions in attacking the enemy simultaneously and sequentially throughout the depth of the battlefield.

Synchronization is the focus of resources and activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point. Although activities such as intelligence, logistics, and fires and maneuver may occur at different times and places, they are synchronized when their combined consequences are felt at the decisive time and place. Effective synchronization uses every resource where it will make the greatest contribution to success.

Versatility is the ability to shift focus, to tailor forces, and to move from one mission to another rapidly and efficiently. It implies a capacity to be multifunctional, to operate across regions throughout the full range of military operations.

Army divisions exploit advances in technology to include space-based platforms. They maximize the increased range, lethality, and accuracy of new systems, conducting simultaneous operations throughout the depth of the battlefield to overwhelm any adversary.

Divisions create combat power throughout the commander's area of operations by combining maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. Division commanders seek to apply overwhelming combat power, bringing all these elements quickly and violently to bear and giving the enemy no opportunity to respond with an effective opposition.

The military doctrine presented in this manual describes fundamental principles that guide the employment of US Army divisions. Although this doctrine is authoritative, it requires judgment in application. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from the Army's collective experience with warfare in recent times. This doctrine, however, cannot replace clear thinking. It does not negate the obligation of commanders to determine proper courses of action under prevailing circumstances, to make good decisions, or to control their units' actions.

CHAPTER 1

THE DIVISION

The division is a large Army organization that trains and fights as a tactical team. Largely self-sustaining, it is capable of independent operations. The division is a unit of maneuver, organized with varying numbers and types of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units. It may be armored, mechanized, medium, light infantry, airborne, or air assault; each can conduct operations over a wide range of environments. The success of Army operations depends on the success of its divisions.

ROLE OF THE DIVISION

Historical Review

Prior to World War I, the regiment was the Army's largest fixed administrative and tactical command. During World War I, regiments combined into brigades to form infantry divisions. Each division had two infantry brigades; each brigade had two regiments. Field artillery and service units supported each brigade.

World War II divisions were infantry, armored, cavalry, airborne, and motorized. Brigade headquarters were eliminated to streamline the divisions. This meant the division commander directly commanded three regiments, supported by engineer and service units and four field artillery battalions. Regiments were still responsible for their own administration and logistics.

Combat commands replaced regiments in some armored divisions. Each combat command had attached tank and armored infantry battalions. Combat commands were tactical operations control headquarters. The logistics and administrative operations extended from division level directly to the battalions. Battalions cross-attached companies to form task forces. Cavalry provided reconnaissance and security and was grouped as the situation demanded. Armored field artillery battalions and engineer companies normally supported the combat commands.

In the late 1950s, the Army reorganized each infantry division into a "pentomic division" with

five battle groups in preparation for tactical nuclear war in Europe. These groups were, in effect, large battalions. Each battle group had five rifle companies, a combat support company, and appropriate field artillery and service support. The battle groups were self-sustaining, could be employed singly or in combinations, and remained largely unchanged during the 1950s.

The pentomic division structure was abandoned in the early 1960s when the Army adopted for all divisions the combat command organization of the armored division. Combat commands were renamed brigades. Each division had three brigade headquarters into which various numbers of battalions could be grouped. All divisions were similarly

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organized. Some were heavy (armored or mechanized) and some were light (infantry and airborne), depending on the mission and types of battalions assigned. In the mid-1960s, the Army added the air assault division. Principal differences between divisions were in the types of battalions assigned and the composition of the division base. Divisions also differed in how they entered into combat. The war in Vietnam was fought primarily with airmobile and infantry divisions.

During the 1980s, the Army fielded a motorized division and several light infantry divisions. The motorized division could rapidly deploy to a contingency area, establish or expand a lodgment, and defeat enemy forces ranging from light infantry to tank and motorized forces. Light divisions provided versatility and strategic flexibility through their capability for rapid deployment.

The early 1990s brought significant changes to the world and the Army. The motorized division was deleted from the force structure. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the apparent end of the Cold War presented threats that were more ambiguous and regionally focused. Most of the Army was reassigned to the continental United States (CONUS) and given a mission to rapidly respond to worldwide regional crises. Force projection has become our chief strategy for supporting the power-projection element of US national security. Force projection applies to the Total Army (active, reserve, and civilian), based within or outside CONUS.

The US Army's current warfighting doctrine reflects the nature of modern warfare. It is inherently joint doctrine, recognizing the teamwork required of all the services. US Army divisions conduct Army operations both in war and other than war arenas. Their prime focus is warfighting—the use of force. Their frequent requirements to use force or to provide forces in operations other than war (OOTW), however, make versatility critical. The unique capabilities of armored, mechanized, infantry, light infantry, airborne, and air assault divisions provide the US Army the flexibility to serve the national interest worldwide.

As Part of a Corps

Army corps are tailored for specific missions. Once tailored and deployed, corps contain all the

organic combat, CS, and CSS capabilities to conduct and sustain operations for a considerable time. Corps plan and conduct major operations and battles. They synchronize the maneuver and support of their units. Corps may be assigned divisions of any type required in war and OOTW.

Traditionally, divisions have operated as part of a US corps. (Currently the 2d Infantry Division is assigned to a Republic of Korea corps.) In corps operations, divisions normally comprise 9 to 12 maneuver battalions, organic artillery battalions, and supporting CS and CSS units. Divisions perform a wide range of tactical missions and, for limited periods, are self-sustaining. Corps augment divisions as the mission requires.

All divisions must be able to deploy and conduct offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations, and operations other than war. Airborne and air assault divisions must be able to conduct force entry operations. (See pages 1-4 to 1-8 for specific division capabilities.)

As Part of a Joint Task Force

The division may deploy as part of a joint task force (JTF) without its traditional corps headquarters and supporting corps units. In these types of operations, a division often works directly for the joint force commander (JFC). Therefore, divisions must know joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. (See joint manuals in references.) Divisions are not normally designated as a joint task force headquarters.

A JTF comprises assigned or attached elements of two or more of the military services. Typically, a JTF is established for a specific purpose in response to a crisis and is limited in scope and duration. Divisions assigned to a JTF normally conduct traditional tactical operations but may be involved in nontraditional actions, such as interagency operations or operations with the host nation.

A division in a JTF requires experienced liaison. The division may operate with or receive support from joint, multinational, interagency, or nongovernmental agencies. It will receive joint support such as joint fires, joint air defenses, national intelligence, and theater and national communications. Competent liaison to coordinate with these agencies and other headquarters helps ensure properly

executed operations. Liaison duties and requirements are addressed in Chapter 3 of this manual and detailed in FM 71-100-1, FM 71-100-2, and FM 101-5.

As an ARFOR Headquarters

A JTF may designate a division under its command and control as the Army forces (ARFOR) headquarters—the senior Army headquarters within the JTF. It may provide support normally associated with the Army service component within the operational area. For example, the Army normally operates ports and delivers bulk class I and class III to other service logistic bases. The ARFOR is normally responsible for all Army forces assigned in the area of operations (AO). The ARFOR designation may also bring with it specific joint force support, training, and administrative responsibilities that vary from theater to theater. The responsibilities of an ARFOR headquarters greatly surpass the division's organic capabilities. The division will

require augmentation based on a mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) analysis.

A division will often be designated as an ARFOR headquarters during OOTW. When the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) was alerted as the ARFOR for Somalia in 1993, the JFC initially assigned to it forty-plus ARFOR tasks. These tasks included the initial deployment of all Army forces, command and control (C²) of coalition ground forces, civil affairs throughout the AO, and communications support for the JTF. Figure 1-1 depicts the 10th Mountain Division headquarters' initial augmentation as the ARFOR for its mission in Somalia.

The division commander could also be responsible for all land combat forces through his appointment as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC). As the JFLCC, the division commander controls all Army, Marine, and multinational ground forces in the AO.




Figure 1-1. Planned division augmentation requirements as ARFOR for Somalia