MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE TARGET DEVELOPMENT

OCTOBER 1999

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
1. Scope

This publication documents tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting Joint Theater Missile Target Development (JTMTD). It establishes a common framework for soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines responsible for intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), sensor employment, collection management, current and future operations, target development, and force application. This common framework will enable them to establish a comprehensive and coordinated approach for countering theater missiles (TM) through prelaunch attack operations against the entire target system. This publication's design recognizes that attack operations against TM is not a mission in itself, but a method of characterizing offensive operations regardless of mission area (e.g., counterair, interdiction, fire support, special operations, etc.) and is the responsibility of all forces.

2. Purpose

This publication is intended to help the joint force commander (JFC) and subordinate component commanders' staffs develop a cohesive approach to JTMTD. The term JFC as used in this publication implies a theater combatant commander (CINC) or subordinate JFC.

3. Application

The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) described in this publication apply to all elements of a joint force. This publication uses approved joint and Service doctrine and terminology as its foundation. It identifies methodologies applicable to national, theater, and component staffs involved in these tasks and contributes to effective use of joint resources and expediting timely attacks. JTMTD focuses on the detailed requirement of intelligence and targeting processes to support attack operations but also residually provides support to active and passive defense.

4. Implementation Plan

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<tr>
<th>Army</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTN: ATDO- A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Monroe VA 23651-5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSN 680-3153  COMM (757) 727-3153</td>
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   | Marine Corps |
   | Commanding General |
   | US Marine Corps Combat Development Command |
   | ATTN: C42 |
   | 3300 Russell Road |
   | Quantico VA 22134-5021 |
   | DSN 278-6234  COMM (703) 784-6234 |
JTMTD
Multiservice Procedures for
Joint Theater Missile Target Development

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

JTMTD
Multiservice Procedures for Joint Theater Missile Target Development

"On the whole, offensive counter-measures to the flying bomb [V-1] brought no direct return commensurate with the great effort devoted to them. A bolder investment in that class of operation might have achieved much. But the Western Allies, hampered by their failure to make a clear-cut choice between the various courses of action open to them, never achieved the singleness of purpose which might have helped them to stake successfully on information that fell short of certainty.

Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom

The quote for Basil Collier reminds us that conducting offensive operations against theater missiles has never been an easy task. The Coalition’s troubles in finding Saddam Hussein’s Scuds during DESERT STORM are reminiscent of the difficulties faced by the Allies in locating Nazi V-1 cruise missiles and V-2 ballistic missiles during World War II. Today our National Military Strategy recognizes that “the proliferation of theater missiles is one of the greatest dangers to US national interest and global security and will remain so into the foreseeable future.” Joint Publication 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, states “the preferred method of countering enemy theater missile (TM) operations is to attack and destroy or disrupt TMs prior to their launch.” Recognition of the importance of this threat, the doctrinal preference for attack operations, and the historical difficulty in achieving successful attacks against TMs were the impetus for producing this publication.

Many of the problems in locating mobile missiles in the past can be traced to difficulties in obtaining timely information and organizing and filtering intelligence operations. This publication establishes a common framework for those individuals responsible for intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), sensor employment, collection management, current and future operations, target development, and force application. This common framework will enable them to establish a comprehensive and coordinated approach for countering TMs through prelaunch attack operations.

The focus of this publication is Joint Theater Missile Target Development (JTMTD). **JTMTD is the synergistic outcome of allocating, integrating and synchronizing resources in order to identify and nominate selected targets in the TM target system for timely attack.** Achieving an effective JTMTD process is a challenge for operational forces. Applying the concepts discussed in this publication will facilitate the process.

Overview

Chapter I provides the reader an understanding of the difficulties associated in trying to find, track, and interdict TM forces. It discusses the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) influence in achieving a cohesive JTMTD effort (principally through training and dedication of resources). It highlights peacetime actions that are imperative to making the JTMTD process effective during crisis or conflict.
Threat Missile Systems

Chapter II provides the reader a basic understanding of the TM target system, generic operating phases, and some specific operating characteristics common to similar systems. It establishes the common framework necessary for the TM IPB development.

Strategies and Procedures

Chapter III explains how to achieve a coherent attack strategy against TMs. It provides a detailed description of how to conduct TM-specific IPB, collection management, and target development processes to achieve the defined objectives.

JTMTD Integration Options

Chapter IV describes options available to the JFC for integrating and synchronizing TM intelligence, collection, and targeting efforts. The four methods discussed in detail are consolidation, collaboration, exchange of liaisons, and collocation.

KEY JTMTD POINTS TO REMEMBER

• Preventing TM launches requires the entire TM target system to be attacked simultaneously and continuously.

• TM IPB must begin in peacetime to succeed in conflict.

• Successful TM IPB comes from knowing the enemy; therefore, it is imperative that analysts who will take it to war help in its creation.

• Collection managers must understand the threat equally as well as analysts; otherwise, the collection effort will be unfocused.

• Every TM event provides a clue--apply knowledge learned from each event to develop the IPB.

• Crosscuing of sensors is imperative to timely target development.

• Avoid the temptation of fixating on killing TELs. Stay focused on neutralizing the enemy’s launch capability.

• Transload operations are excellent targets, but forward operating locations/bases (FOLs)/FOBs are outstanding targets.

• Operational decision makers must understand the JTMTD process too!
PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this publication:

**Joint**
- Joint Warfighting Center, Ft Monroe, VA
- Joint Theater Missile Defense-Attack Operations Joint Test Force, Kirkland AFB, NM
- Joint Warfighters Joint Test and Evaluation (J T&E), Suffolk, VA
- Joint Targeting School, Dam Neck, VA
- Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Dahlgren, VA
- Joint Attack Operations Working Group, (BMDO/J -8), Washington, D.C.
- Joint National Test Facility, Colorado Springs, CO
- Air Intelligence Center, Norfolk, VA
- BMDO, AQJ, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

**Unified/Combined**
- USCINCPAC/J 222, Honolulu, HI
- USCENTCOM, J I CCENT/WMD Cell, MacDill AFB, FL
- USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL
- USACOM, J T2, Suffolk, VA
- USFK, J -3, Korea

**Army**
- US Army Training and Doctrine Command, DCSDOC (ATDO-A), Fort Monroe, VA
- Third Army Deep Operations Coordination Cell, Fort McPherson, GA
- ARSPACECOM, Colorado Springs, CO
- Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Fort Bliss, TX
- Army Deep and Simultaneous Attack Battlelab, Fort Sill, OK
- Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK
- Army Military Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ
- Army Space and Missile Defense Battlelab, Colorado Springs, CO
- XVIII Airborne Corps, Collection Management, Fort Bragg, NC
- 1st Special Forces Group, Fort Lewis, WA

**Marine Corps**
- Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Joint Doctrine Branch (C427), Quantico, VA
- COMMARFORLANT, G-2, Norfolk, VA

**Navy**
- Navy Warfare Development Command (Det Norfolk), Norfolk, VA

**Air Force**
- HQ AFDC, Det 1, Langley Air Force Base, VA
- ACC/DIFT, Langley AFB, VA
- 28th Test Squadron, Eglin AFB, FL
32d AOS, Ramstein AFB, GE
609th Combat Plans Squadron, Shaw AFB, SC
497 IG/INOT, Falls Church, VA
93rd ACW, Robins AFB, GA
607th AIS, Osan AFB, ROK

OTHER
Zel Tech Corporation, Hampton, VA
Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA
SPARTA Corporation, Huntsville, AL
ARES Corporation, Arlington, VA
BDM Corporation, Hampton, VA
Chapter I
OVERVIEW

From the beginning to the end of the war, Scuds introduced a serious friction into the conduct of the air campaign—one that did not affect the final outcome, but only due to the absence of any other Iraqi successes. There is, moreover, a larger issue: the question of might-have-beens. Except for the hit at the war’s end that killed a large number of U.S. Army reservists, the Scuds achieved little damage and few deaths. Nevertheless, a Scud nearly hit the USS Tarawa, while that ship was tied up at the main dock at Dhahran—a dock piled high with ammunition. It does not take much imagination to visualize what an actual hit might have achieved in political and psychological terms.

- Gulf War Air Power Survey

1. Background

Ballistic, cruise, and nontactical air-to-surface missiles have been a threat to the United States (US) and its military operations for over 50 years. During the Cold War, the strategic balance and deterrence created by the theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD) between Soviet and US forces held this threat in check. The value of retaliation as a deterrent to rogue states has waned in the post-Cold War era as theater missiles (TMs) have proliferated.

The military arsenals of nations worldwide are becoming stocked with an expanding number and variety of missile systems. Most are imported, some are developed domestically, and a few are indigenously modified. Missile threats emanate primarily from developed first-tier and emergent second-tier countries armed with missiles that can range from 30 to greater than 3000 kilometers. Some countries possess hundreds of fixed and mobile missile launchers. Although they currently pose only a regional threat, the trend is clearly towards systems with greater range, lethality, accuracy, and sophistication.

TMs appeal to developing nations for a variety of reasons and are often considered symbols of national stature. TMs enable rogue states to strike deep into neighboring nations, placing the populace as well as that government’s forces at risk. Compared to other weapon systems, TMs’ relatively long range, short time-of-flight, low cost, and flexibility in carrying a variety of warheads provide numerous political and military advantages. TMs also appeal to developing nations because defenses against them are not as mature as defenses against other weapons systems. Our National Military Strategy recognizes that “the proliferation of theater missiles is one of the greatest dangers to US national interest and global security and will remain so into the foreseeable future.”

2. The Case for Prelaunch Attack Operations against Theater Missiles

No nation in any war has ever effectively countered TMs by reactively attacking missile launchers. There are many parallels between the allied efforts during World War II (WWII) to counter Hitler’s V-1/V-2 rockets and the Coalition’s efforts to counter Saddam Hussein’s Scuds during the Gulf War. The vignettes cited throughout this publication reinforce one key point—mobile long-range missiles provide an adversary an asymmetric