Namesake:
Admiral Arleigh Burke
Arleigh Albert Burke, the grandson of a Swedish immigrant,
was born on a farm in the foothills of the Rocky Mountains near
Boulder, Colorado on 19 October 1901, the first of six children.
He attended a one room elementary school through the eighth
grade and then high school in Boulder. Deciding early that
farming fitted neither his talents nor desires, he sought and
received a congressional appointment to the US Naval Academy. He
entered the Naval Academy in June 1919 and graduated on 7 June
1923, standing 71 in a class of 413. On the afternoon of
Graduation Day, he was married in the Naval Academy Chapel to
Roberta Gorsuch of Washington, D.C. who became his beloved wife,
his best friend and lifelong companion, and, at age 97, his only
survivor.
Following graduation Burke served in the battleship USS
ARIZONA (BB-39) for five years. Thereafter, he served afloat in
fleet auxiliary USS PROCYON (AG-11), heavy cruiser USS CHESTER
(CA-27), fleet auxiliary USS ANTARES and fleet auxiliary USS
ARGONNE. Ashore he completed postgraduate study in Ordnance
Engineering and served two tours in the Bureau of Ordnance. In
June 1937, he was ordered to his first destroyer as prospective
Executive Officer of USS CRAVEN (DD-382), under construction in
Boston Navy Yard. In August 1938 - early in his sixteenth year
of commissioned service - he was promoted to Lieutenant
Commander and in June 1939 took command of USS MUGFORD (DD-389),
sister ship to CRAVEN. During his tour, MUGFORD excelled in
gunnery and participated in the development of high speed night
gunnery and torpedo attack tactics. After little more than a
year in command, Burke was relieved and reassigned to the Naval
Gun Factory in Washington, D.C. and was there when the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor. Despite his persistent requests for sea
duty, he remained there until the end of 1942.
In January 1943, he was awarded command of DESTROYER
DIVISION 43 and hoisted his flag in USS WALLER (DD-466) which,
in March 1943, blew up a Japanese destroyer in the Central
Solomons. In May, he shifted to command of DESTROYER DIVISION
44, flagship USS CONWAY (DD-507), where he received wounds while
escorting convoys in the Solomons. Captain Burke took over
DESTROYER SQUADRON 12 in August 1943 and DESTROYER SQUADRON 23
(Little Beavers) in October. In addition Burke commanded one of
the squadron's two divisions, DESTROYER DIVISION 45, with his
flag in USS CHARLES AUSBURNE (DD-570).
In October, Burke was detached from DESRON TWELVE and
ordered to command DESRON TWENTY THREE. During the next four
months the squadron participated in 22 separate engagements and
destroyed one Japanese cruiser, nine destroyers, one submarine,
several smaller ships and approximately 30 aircraft. Between
operations the U.S. surface combatants exercised at night high
speed tactics, where, thus far, the Japanese had excelled. Burke
was a leader in this effort. Notable among these actions was the
battle of Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainveille, in early November
and later that month the Battle of Cape St. George, New Ireland,
where Burke led his destroyers in night torpedo attacks on
Japanese surface forces. This battle is regarded by many naval
historians as the perfect naval engagement. He was awarded the
Navy Cross for "extraordinary heroism in operations against
an armed enemy" in the Battle of Cape St. George. The ships
of the time were capable of 34 knots, but while enroute to a
rendezvous prior to that battle, a boiler casualty had limited
his group's top speed to 30 knots. When the fleet commander
signalled him to make best speed, they mustered an extra knot
and he answered "Proceeding at 31 knots" The response,
addressed to "31-knot" Burke was a "rib",
but captured the imagination of the press and the public and
conveyed the image of a dashing, hard-charging combat commander
- an accurate description of Arleigh Burke. Early in the new
year the decision was made to bypass Rabaul in favor of the
Admiralty Islands, 300 miles farther west. DESRON 23 supported
landings at Cape Gloucester, in the Green Islands, and
participated in the bombardment of Rabaul and its backup base at
Kavieng. On the morning of 22 February, Burke's destroyers sank
a large Japanese naval tug and rescued 73 survivors. When the
captain, who had chosen to fight rather than capitulate, was not
among the survivors, Burke ordered a brief prayer service in his
honor, an action which gained him great respect in post-war
Japan.
In March, Burke, to his great surprise, received orders to
report to Commander Carrier Division THREE, Vice Admiral Marc
Mitscher, as Chief of Staff. Mitscher had recently become
Commander Fast Carrier Task Forces Pacific (CTF 58) and was one
of the great naval leaders of W.W.II. Burke was disappointed in
the assignment which took him away from his beloved destroyers;
Mitscher was equally disappointed to find that his highly
capable aviator chief of staff was to be relieved by a surface
officer. (Admiral Ernest King had directed that a surface
officer commanding a fleet or task force must have an aviator
chief of staff and vice versa.)
Burke and Mitscher soon formed an exceptionally close
relationship which was to endure throughout the war and into the
postwar years. During the next fifteen months, TF 58, with four
carrier task groups, roamed the western Pacific, striking enemy
airfields, shipping, and industrial facilities in their island
strongholds; in the Philippines and on Formosa and Okinawa; and
in the Japanese home islands. The task force participated in all
the major actions of the Pacific war; the assault on the
Marianas - Guam, Tinian, and Saipan - in June and the ensuing
battle of the Philippine Sea; the return to the Philippines and
the battle of Leyte Gulf in October; the invasion of the
Carolines and the capture of Iwo Jima in February and March of
1945; and the invasion of Okinawa in April and May.
On the morning of 11 May, Mitscher's flagship, USS BUNKER
HILL, operating in the vicinity of Okinawa, was hit and
grievously damaged by two kamikaze aircraft. Flag spaces,
including the flag office and radio central, were hard hit and a
large number of the TF 58 staff were killed. Burke led the
effort to rescue survivors, helping to drag the wounded and
injured men from radio central. Because of the severity of the
damage to BUNKER HILL, Mitscher, Burke, and the remainder of the
staff transferred to ENTERPRISE. Three days later ENTERPRISE,
too, was hit in a kamikaze attack and put out of action. The
staff again shifted flagships, this time to USS RANDOLPH.
On 28 May 1945, Mitscher, Burke, and the staff of TF 58
were relieved and departed for the United States. For them,
combat operations had ended. Burke, who had earlier been
promoted to the wartime rank of Commodore, reverted to his
permanent rank of Captain and was reassigned to the Navy
Department in Washington to head a new section for defense
against kamikaze attacks. He was there when the war ended.
After a brief tour in the Bureau of Ordnance, Burke
returned to sea with VADM Mitscher early in 1946 as Chief of
Staff of the Eighth Fleet, being formed for Mediterranean duty.
In midsummer, plans for deployment of the fleet were placed on
hold and Admiral Mitscher was ordered to relieve Admiral Jonas
Ingram as CINCLANTFLT which he did in September. Burke continued
to serve as his Chief of Staff until February 1947 when
Mitscher, who had been ill throughout much of the war and had
never regained his health, suffered a heart attack and died.
Thus ended the long, close relationship of two of the great
combat leaders of WWII.
Reassigned to the Navy's General Board in Washington after
Mitscher's death, Burke, recognizing that his experience had
been limited through necessity to warfighting skills, began a
serious effort to broaden his understanding and knowledge of
history, economics, science, politics, and international
relations. He foresaw a need to study and define the future
national security interests of the United States and the role of
the Navy in pursuing those interests. This eventually led to a
comprehensive paper, completed in mid-1948, entitled "National
Security and Naval Contributions for the Next Ten Years."
The paper, as such, had little impact but it contributed
mightily to the development of Arleigh Burke as a strategic
thinker and to his reputation.
In July 1948, Burke took command of the light cruiser, USS
HUNTINGTON, then deployed to the Sixth Fleet. After fewer than
six months in command, he received an unexpected set of orders
to report immediately to the staff of the Chief of Naval
Operations in Washington to head the OPNAV section which dealt
with matters concerning unification of the armed services. There
he became a key player in what was to become known as "the
revolt of the Admirals." A primary issue was the strategic
role and relative capability of the Air Force B-36 bomber
vis-à-vis
the Navy's proposed supercarrier. In hearings before the House
Armed Services Committee in October 1949, Secretary of the Navy
Mathews led off by supporting Secretary of Defense Louis
Johnson's position favoring the B-36 and relegating Navy
aviation to a secondary role. He was followed by CINCPACFLT,
Admiral Arthur Radford; by the naval leaders of WWII - King,
Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance and others including Burke; and by the
CNO, Admiral Louis Denfield. The naval officers uniformly took
issue with the SECDEF and SECNAV position. (Burke and his small
staff had been instrumental in orchestrating the Navy position.)
Following the hearings, Secretary Mathews forced Admiral
Denfield into retirement prior to completion of his term and
attempted to remove Burke's name from the promotion list to Rear
Admiral. This latter action was over-ruled by President Truman.
The Committee Report of 1 March 1950 offered no opinion on the
B-36/aircraft carrier dispute and concluded that the government
should accept the advice of the military professionals of each
service regarding weapons.
By the time the Committee report was issued the new CNO,
Admiral Forrest Sherman, had disbanded Burke's OPNAV office and
Burke had been reassigned as the Navy representative on the
Defense Research and Development Board. He was promoted to Rear
Admiral on 15 July 1950 and in August ordered to the staff of
Commander, Naval Forces Far East as Deputy Chief of Staff. The
Korean War was, by then, in its third month and there was an
urgent need for a senior officer with warfighting experience on
the staff (as well as for a trusted emissary who could, and
would, report directly to Admiral Sherman on the conduct of
operations. Burke did this, but with the full knowledge of VADM
Joy, COMNAVFE.) Burke arrived on station just in time to
participate in the planning for the Inchon landing and for
support of the subsequent drive north to the Chinese border. The
UN offensive ended in November when the Red Chinese armies
crossed the Yalu River and drove the allied forces back down the
peninsula. The battle line eventually stabilized in mid-January
just south of Seoul.
After a brief sojourn in command of Cruiser Division FIVE,
Burke was again ordered to Korea on "temporary duty"
to join the UN team, headed by VADM Joy, appointed to negotiate
an armistice with the North Koreans. He remained in this
assignment as one of the two principal negotiators for the UN
until a cease fire line was established in November. Returning
to Washington, Burke assumed duty as Director of the Strategic
Plans Division in OPNAV. Following the inauguration of President
Eisenhower in January 1953 and the introduction of the "New
Look" defense policy, Burke was again called upon to define
and defend the Navy's roles, missions, and command structure and
philosophy. He remained until March 1954, when he was relieved
and reassigned as Commander, Cruiser Division SIX. He was there
for the rest of the year until ordered to duty as Commander
Destroyer Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMDESLANT). Four months
later in May 1955, he was selected over 99 officers senior to
him - every four and three star officer in the Navy and a number
of senior two star officers - to relieve Admiral Robert Carney
as the Chief of Naval Operations.
Upon becoming CNO on 17 August 1955, Admiral Burke could
look back upon a naval career of 32 years in which he had served
his apprenticeship at sea, completed postgraduate study and
acquired technical expertise in shore assignments, demonstrated
brilliance and achieved fame as a wartime commander, gained
broad experience in the application of military power and,
through self-study, in the wider fields of history, economics,
politics, and national security affairs. He was a tough
taskmaster who insisted on the best efforts of his people and
was intolerant of laxity and poor work. He worked
extraordinarily long hours and demanded the same from his staff.
He believed that an overworked staff was more productive than
one that worked routine hours. He was modest, however, about his
own achievements and loyal to his associates. One of his
greatest attributes was his ability to set clear objectives and
goals and then allow his subordinates leeway to achieve them
without interference or undue supervision. He was well and
thoroughly prepared to lead the Navy. He was reappointed to a
second two year term in 1957, a third in 1959, and declined a
fourth in 1961.
One of Burke's first and foremost priorities as CNO was
the development of a solid propellant fleet ballistic missile.
He established the Special Projects Office, appointed RADM
William Raborn as head, and gave him wide latitude to accomplish
the objective. Polaris was the result. Another priority was
construction of nuclear powered surface ships - carriers,
cruisers, and destroyers. USS LONG BEACH and USS ENTERPRISE were
authorized and built, and USS BAINBRIDGE and USS TRUXTUN
followed. He pressed for conversion of cruisers to employ guided
missiles and their introduction in other ships to defend against
air attack. Antisubmarine warfare programs were accelerated and
an Atlantic Fleet Antisubmarine Defense Force was established to
test and evaluate sensors and weapons, and to develop tactics
and coordination of air, surface, and submarine forces. He took
pains to ensure that the Navy achieved and maintained a high
state of readiness. He was the chief spokesman for the Navy and
was tireless in his efforts to educate the public on sea power
and the Navy. He functioned as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and continued, not always successfully, his fight against
further centralization in the Department of Defense. On 25 July
1961 in ceremonies at the U.S. Naval Academy, Admiral Burke was
relieved as the Chief of Naval Operations and retired. He
remains the longest serving Chief of Naval Operations in the
history of the U.S. Navy.
Historical Notes:
The USS ARLEIGH BURKE is the first ship of the
AEGIS
destroyer class, it was commissioned on the Fourth of July,
1991. This ship was designed to take advantage of evolving
technology while reducing ship construction costs. The AEGIS
cruiser was too expensive to continue building and too difficult
to backfit with new technologies.
Even before the ARLEIGH BURKE destroyer was completely
built, Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force was
involved in the initial phases of testing. New systems, operated
by fleet sailors ashore, were examined at land-based test
facilities. The combat system test took place at the Combat
System Engineering Development Site in Moorestown, New Jersey.
The propulsion plant test occurred at the Gas Turbine Ship
Land-Based Engineering Site in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. These
test results supported the acquisition decision to begin limited
production of the ship class.
After commissioning, USS ARLEIGH BURKE hosted follow-on
at-sea operational testing throughout 1992. This test revealed
engineering problems that required resolution by the design and
production groups. An additional phase of testing was added to
retest the engineering solutions to those problems.
In April 2001, USS ARLEIGH BURKE was attached to the USS
HARRY S. TRUMAN Battle Group, deployed to the Persian Gulf in
support of Operation Southern Watch, it returned to Norfolk,
Va., in late May.
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The
Tradition A
ship's crest is an insignia designed specifically
for a particular vessel. During World War II, crests
decorated the bridges and smokestacks of hundreds of
American naval vessels. Strictly speaking, none of
this art work was legal - at least according to
wartime military regulations - but that didn't bother the men of the
U.S. Navy. Most insignias were
designed by and for crewmembers. Insignias have also
been used to represent a group of ships. During the
1940s, some vessels carried squadron insignias. For
the Sailors of Arleigh Burke's Destroyer Squadron
23, it all started when one crewmember scribbled a
drawing of the comic strip character "Little
Beaver" on a torpedo tube. Later, when the
Little Beaver was adopted as the "official"
squadron insignia, all squadron members became known
as Little Beavers. In the mid-1950s, the U.S. Navy
bowed to the inevitable and recognized crests and
insignias, but only for unofficial use. Today, the
designing of crests has become a formalized art,
with each element of the crest having a specific
symbolic meaning. Now, most new ship crests are
drawn up by the Institute of Heraldry. 
